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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
CONTRACTS-CONTINGENT FEE FOR FACT WiTNEss-[Fderal].--An at-
torney and an accountant brought suit to recover $1,000 in fees for ser-
vices rendered in the trial of a suit by the defendant. Before that trial the
attorney for the defendant informed the plaintiffs that he wished their
help and that if the case should be won he would ask for $75,000 in addition
to the fees already agreed upon, of which the plaintiffs would get 10 per
cent to be divided between them. Neither of the plaintiffs took any part in
the trial except to testify to facts which they had previously learned as
agents and attorneys of the defendants. The district court allowed the fees,
and the defendant appealed. Held, reversed. The contract was invalid. Any
agreement to pay an ordinary witness compensation in addition to that pro-
vided by law is void as contrary to public policy and as lacking in con-
sideration. Alexander v. Watson.,
It has been held that attorneys should avoid testifying in behalf of their
clients except when their testimony is essential to the ends of justice2 or
merely concerns formal matters.- The better practice is for the attorney to
withdraw from the case as soon as it is apparent that he will have to
testify.4 However, if he does testify, his testimony is not incompetent, and
the fact that he is retained in the case goes only to the weight of his
testimony.5 Of course, when he has definitely and completely severed his
professional connections with the party in the case, he is not disqualified.6
1. Alexander v. Watson (C. C. A. 4, 1942) 128 F. (2d) 627.
2. Sengebush v. Edgerton (1935) 120 Conn. 367, 180 Atl. 694; Moody v.
Norton (1915) 192 Ill. App. 8; Ferraro v. Taylor (1936) 197 Minn. 5, 265
N. W. 829.
8. Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association §19,
(1987) 62 A. B. A. 1112. First Calumet Trust & Savings Bank v. Rogers
(C. C. A. 7, 1923) 289 Fed. 953; Freund v. Johnson (C. C. A. 7, 1931) 46
F. (2d) 272; Nanos v. Harrison (1922) 97 Conn. 529, 117 Atl. 803; Ropkins
v. Frasctore (1922) 97 Conn. 708, 118 Atl. 129; Miller v. Urban (1937) 123
Conn. 331, 195 Atl. 193; Nye Odorless Incinerator Corp. v. Felton (1931)
85 Del. 286, 162 Atl. 504; In re Normand's Estate (1911) 88 Neb. 767,
180 N. W. 571; Cox v. Kee (1922) 107 Neb. 587, 186 N. W. 974; Penczak v.
Penczak (1927) 238 Mich. 97, 213 N. W. 117; Burnett v. Taylor (1927)
86 Wyo. 12, 252 Pac. 790.
4. Callas v. Independent Taxi Owners' Ass'n (App. D. C. 1933) 66 F.
(2d) 192; Nanos v. Harrison (1922) 97 Conn. 592, 117 Atl. 803; Jennings
v. Di Genova (1928) 107 Conn. 491, 141 Atl. 866; Onstott v. Edel (1908)
282 Ill. 201, 83 N. E. 806, 13 Ann. Cas. 28; Cuvelier v. Town of Durmont
(1986) 221 Iowa 1016, 266 N. W. 517; State v. Woodside (1849) 31 N. C.
496; Inman v. Inman (1932) 158 Va. 597, 164 S. E. 383; Connolly v. Straw
(1881) 58 Wis. 645, 11 N. W. 17; Allen v. Ross (1929) 199 Wis. 162, 225
N. W. 831; Interior Woodwork Co. v. Buhler (1932) 207 Wis. 1, 238 N. W.
822.
5. Newman v. Bradley (U. S. 1788) 1 DalI. 240; French v. Hall (1886)
119 U. S. 152; Sorrin v. Pacific Finance Corp. (D C. S. D. N. Y. 1941)
87 F. Supp. 527; Wollschlaeger v. Mix (1936) 364 I1. 207, 4 N. E. (2d)
89; Shlensky v. Shlensky (1938) 369 Inl. 179, 15 N. E. (2d) 694; In re
Stephens' Estate (1940) 207 Minn. 597, 293 N. W. 90; In Pennsylvania it
is held that it is for the discretion of the trial court whether the attorney
may participate in the trial after testifying as a witness in that case. See
Pentimall v. Bankers' Auto Finance Corp. (1927) 92 Pa. Super. 110; Se-
curity Trust Co. of Pottstown v. Stapp (1938) 332 Penn. 9, 1 A. (2d) 236.
6. Woodward v. City of Waterbury (1931) 113 Conn. 457, 155 Atl. 825;
McLaughlin v. Shields (1829) 12 Pa. 283.
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While the foregoing refers to the attorney in the role of an ordinary wit-
ness, the rule appears to be the same when he testifies as an expert wit-
ness with or without a contingent fee.7
The fee to be paid to ordinary fact witnesses in the state and federal
courts is fixed by law.8 Contracts for payment of contingent fees in excess
of the prescribed amount are held invalid as lacking consideration and
against public policy. 9 However, if the witness resides outside the juridic-
tion of the court's process it has been held that there is consideration for
the contract to pay him a reasonable amount in excess of the statutory
fee.10 But contracts to compensate the witness for loss of time are invalid,
since they, if permitted, might be used by witnesses to extort unreasonable
fees for their testimony."
In accordance with these rules the court rightly found that, since the
plaintiffs had severed their professional connections with the defendant and
testified only as to facts which they had acquired during their employment
by the defendant, the plaintiffs were not experts but ordinary fact witnesses
and that their contract for witness fees in excess of those required by law
was invalid. R. R. N., Jr.
7. Wilhelm v. Rush (1937) 18 Cal. App. (2d) 366, 63 P. (2d) 1158;
Clifford v. Hughes (1910) 139 App. Div. 730, 124 N. Y. S. 478. For the
distinction between fees for expert or opinion testimony which can be re-
quired under ordinary subpoena and fees to compensate experts for extra
services, see Comment (1941) 27 WASHINGTON U. LAw QUARTERLY 583, 585.
8. Judicial Code and Judiciary Act (1874) R. S. 848; 28 U. S. C. A.
§601; 1. S. Mo. 1939 §13420; Ill. Revised Statutes, 53, §65.
9. Dawkins v. Gill (1846) 10 Ala. 206; Pelkey v. Hodge (1931) 112 Cal.
App. 424, 296 Pac. 908; Dodge v. Stiles (1857) 26 Conn. 463; Walker v.
Cook (1889) 33 Ill. App. 561; Boehmer v. Foval (1894) 55 Ill. App. 71;
Burchell v. Ledford (1928) 226 Ky. 155, 10 S. W. (2d) 622; Sherman v.
Burton (1911) 165 Mich. 293, 130 N. W. 667; Quirk v. Muller (1894) 14
Mont. 467; Sweany v. Hunter (1808) 5 N. C. (1 Murph.) 181; Lyon v.
Hussey (1894) 82 Hun. 15, 31 N. Y. S. 281; Cowles v. Rochester Folding
Box Co. (1904) 81 App. Div. 414, 80 N. Y. S. 811, 71 N. E. 468 (Aff. 179
N. Y. 87); Clifford v. Hughes (1910) 139 App. Div. 730, 124 N. Y. S. 478;
In re Certain Lands (1911) 128 N. Y. S. 999 (Aff. In re New York 97
N. E. 1103); Perry v. Dicken (1884) 105 Penn. 83, 51 Am. Rep. 181; In re
Ramschasel's Estate (1904) 24 Pa. Super. 262; Bowling v. Blum (Texas
1899) 52 S. W. 97; Wright v. Corbin (1937) 190 Wash. 260, 67 P. (2d)
868; Pool v. Sacheverel (1720) 1 P. Wins. 675, 24 Eng. Rep. 565. See Note,
16 A. L. R. 1457.
10. Gaines v. Molen (1887) 30 Fed. 27; Lincoln Mountain Gold Min. Co.
v. Williams (1906) 37 Colo. 193, 85 Pac. 844; Keown & McEvoy Inc. v.
Verlin (1925) 253 Mass. 374, 149 N. E. 115, 41 A. L. R. 1319; State ex rel.
Spillman v. First Bank of Nickerson (1926) 114 Neb. 423, 207 N. W. 674,
45 A. L. R. 1418; Nickelson v. Wilson (1875) 60 N. Y. 362; Armstrong v.
Prentice (1893) 86 Wis. 210; Thatcher v. Darr (1921) 27 Wyo. 452, 199
Pac. 938, 16 A. L. R. 1442; Willis v. Peckham (1820) 1 Brod. & B. 515,
129 Eng. Rep. 821.
11. Wright v. Somers (1906) 125 I1. App. 256; Moor v. Adam (1816)
5 Maule & S. 156, 105 Eng. Rep. 1009; Lonergan v. Royal Exch. Assur. Co.
(1831) 7 Bing 729, 131 Eng. Rep. 282.
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